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THE SUPPRESSION COURT APPLIED THE WRONG “DEBOUR” LEVEL TO THE INITIAL INQUIRY BY THE OFFICER WHO APPROACHED DEFENDANT AND REQUESTED THAT HE STEP OUT OF THE CAR; BECAUSE THE SUPPRESSION ISSUE HAD NOT BEEN RULED UPON UNDER THE CORRECT “DEBOUR” STANDARD, THE APPELLATE COURT COULD NOT CONSIDER THE ISSUE AND THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR A RULING UNDER THE CORRECT “DEBOUR” STANDARD (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reserving decision, remitted the matter for another ruling on defendant’s suppression motion. The trial judge determined that the police officer conducted a level one (DeBour) inquiry when he ordered the defendant out of the car. In fact, the officer conducted a level three inquiry which required reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Because the ruling on defendant’s suppression motion was based upon the wrong standard, the matter was remitted for a ruling under the correct standard:

… [T]he patrol lieutenant engaged in a level three intrusion under De Bour when he ordered the occupants out of the vehicle … . Although an “officer’s initial approach of [a person] and request for identification [may constitute] a permissible level one encounter” under De Bour, it is well established that an “officer’s request that [a person] exit [a] parked vehicle elevate[s] the situation to a level three encounter under De Bour” and requires reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot … .

Because the court erroneously concluded that the patrol lieutenant engaged in only a level one intrusion when he directed defendant to step out of the vehicle, the court had no occasion to consider whether the patrol lieutenant had reasonable suspicion justifying that directive … . Although the People concede that the patrol lieutenant lacked reasonable suspicion, we are precluded “from reviewing an issue that . . . was not decided by the trial court” … . People v Taylor, 2024 NY Slip Op 01449, Fourth Dept 3-15-24

Practice Point: When the police officer approached defendant and asked defendant to get out of the car, the officer was conducting a level three DeBour inquiry which required reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The suppression judge erroneously applied the criteria for a level one inquiry and denied suppression. Because the correct suppression issue was never ruled upon, the appellate court was forced to remit the matter for a ruling under the correct DeBour standard.

 

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