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BECAUSE MOTHER HAD RELINQUISHED CUSTODY OF THE CHILD TO THE MATERNAL GRANDFATHER FOR MORE THAN 24 MONTHS, THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE HELD A “BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD” HEARING BEFORE RULING ON MOTHER’S PETITION FOR SOLE CUSTODY (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Family Court, determined the maternal grandfather, who had custody of the child for more than 24 months with the consent of mother, demonstrated “extraordinary circumstances’ which warrant a “best interests of the child” hearing before ruling on mother’s petition for custody:

Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 72, “an ‘extended disruption of custody’ between the child and the parent ‘shall constitute an extraordinary circumstance'” … . “The statute defines ‘extended disruption of custody’ as including, but not limited to, ‘a prolonged separation of the respondent . . . and the child for at least twenty-four continuous months during which the parent voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child and the child resided in the household of the petitioner grandparent or grandparents'” … . “Where extraordinary circumstances are present, the court must then consider the best interests of the child in awarding custody” … .

… [T]he maternal grandfather sustained his burden of demonstrating the existence of extraordinary circumstances. The evidence at the hearing established a prolonged separation of the subject child from the mother for more than 24 continuous months, during which the mother voluntarily relinquished care and control of the child and the child resided in the household of the maternal grandfather … . Matter of Elisa F. v Daniel D., 2024 NY Slip Op 01306, Second Dept 3-13-24

Practice Point: Here the child, with mother’s consent, was in the custody of the maternal grandfather for more than 24 months before mother brought the petition for sole custody. The maternal grandfather’s custody of the child for mote than 24 months constituted “extraordinary circumstances” warranting a “best interests of the child” hearing before ruling on mother’s petition.

 

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