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RABBINICAL COURT IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER DOCTRINE OF ARBITRAL IMMUNITY.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined rabbinical arbitrators were immune from suit in the absence of an allegation the rabbinical court acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. The fact that a court previously determined the rabbinical court acted in excess of its authority did not destroy the arbitral immunity:

Here, the factual allegations of the complaint merely asserted conduct by the rabbinical defendants in their capacity as arbitrators … . It is well established that arbitrators are immune from liability for acts performed in their arbitral capacity … . Such immunity also applies to acts taken in excess of authority … . As the plaintiffs failed to allege how any of the acts of the rabbinical court defendants were undertaken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, these defendants enjoy arbitral immunity from civil liability … . Pinkesz Mut. Holdings, LLC v Pinkesz, 2016 NY Slip Op 04034, 2nd Dept 5-25-16

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