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WHATEVER TIME REMAINS ON THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHEN THE COVID TOLL BEGAN IS ALL THAT IS LEFT WHEN TO TOLL IS LIFTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that, although the statute of limitations in this personal injury action was subject to the COVID toll, the three-year statute just picked up at the end of the toll where it left off at the beginning of the toll. Therefore plaintiff was not entitled to simply add on the length of the toll (228 days) when the toll was lifted. Plaintiff only had 152 days left when the toll was lifted:

… [D]ue to the tolling provision of the executive orders, the statute of limitations within which the plaintiff was required to file the instant action was tolled between March 20, 2020, and November 3, 2020, a period of 228 days … . However, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, she did not have an additional 228 days, the length of the tolling period, after the toll’s expiration to commence the action. Instead, the remaining 152 days left on her three-year statute of limitations started to run after the toll was lifted on November 4, 2020 … . Since this action was commenced on April 19, 2021, the plaintiff did not timely commence the action within t…he statute of limitations that expired on April 4, 2021…. . Ruiz v Sanchez, 2023 NY Slip Op 04608, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Whatever time remains on the applicable statute of limitations when the COVID toll began is all that is left when the COVID toll is lifted.

 

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