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PROTECTIVE ORDER DELAYING DISCOVERY UNTIL 45 DAYS BEFORE TRIAL GRANTED BY THE APPELLATE COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, granted the People’s application for a protective order delaying release of discovery until 45 days before trial:

Pursuant to CPL 245.70(6), a party who has unsuccessfully sought, or opposed the granting of, a protective order relating to the name, address, contact information, or statements of a person may obtain expedited review by an individual justice of the intermediate appellate court to which an appeal from a judgment of conviction would be taken. Where, as here, “the issue involves balancing the defendant’s interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for witness safety and protection, the question is appropriately framed as whether the determination made by the trial court was a provident exercise of discretion” … .

Applying the factors set forth in CPL 245.70(4), including concerns for witness safety and protection, I conclude that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in directing immediate disclosure of the subject materials to counsel for the defendant and his investigator. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court should have delayed disclosure of the subject materials to counsel for the defendant and his investigator until 45 days before trial. People v Brown, 2020 NY Slip Op 01439, Second Dept 2-28-20

 

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