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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN WAS STRUCK CROSSING THE STREET WHERE THERE WAS NO CROSSWALK, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT DRIVER FAILED TO SEE WHAT SHE SHOULD HAVE SEEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s summary judgment motion in this pedestrian-car accident case should not have been granted. Although plaintiff pedestrian violated the Vehicle and Traffic law by crossing the street where there was no crosswalk, plaintiff raised a question of fact about whether defendant-driver failed to see what she should have seen:

The defendant established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that, under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff’s own conduct in crossing the roadway outside of a crosswalk was the sole proximate cause of the accident, and that the defendant was not at fault in the happening of the accident … . However, in opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant failed to exercise due care to avoid striking the plaintiff with her vehicle by failing to see that which, through the proper use of her senses, she should have seen (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1146[a] …). Davis v Khalil, 2023 NY Slip Op 01659, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: Plaintiff pedestrian was struck by defendant driver crossing a road where there was no crosswalk in violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. However, there was a question of fact whether defendant driver failed to see what she should have seen.

 

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