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APPELLANT WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR OR OWNER, DID NOT SUPERVISE AND CONTROL PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND DID NOT HAVE CONTROL OVER THE WORK SITE; THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 240(1), 241(6) AND 200 CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED IN THIS CONSTRUCTION-DEBRIS-SLIP-AND-FALL CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the appellant, which was hired by the construction manager to put in concrete steps, was bit an agent of the general contractor or the owner and did not exercise supervisory control plaintiff’s work in this Labor Law 200, 240(1) and 241(6) action. Plaintiff worked for an HVAC contractor and fell over construction debris on a temporary ramp leading to the entrance of the premises:

To hold a defendant liable as an agent of the general contractor or the owner for violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), there must be a showing that it had the authority to supervise and control the work that brought about the injury …  “The determinative factor is whether the party had the right to exercise control over the work, not whether it actually exercised that right” … . “Where the owner or general contractor does in fact delegate the duty to conform to the requirements of the Labor Law to a third-party subcontractor, the subcontractor becomes the statutory agent of the owner or general contractor” … .

Here, the appellant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that it was not an agent of the general contractor or the owner with regard to the plaintiff’s work … . There was no evidence that the appellant had any authority to supervise or control the work of the plaintiff … . … [T]he appellant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that it did not have control over the work site … . Fiore v Westerman Constr. Co., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 04460, Second Dept 12-12-20

 

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