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THE RULES OF THE ROAD APPLY TO BICYCLISTS; HERE THE BICYCLIST DARTED OUT INTO TRAFFIC FROM IN FRONT OF A PARKED VAN; THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPARTMENT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the rules of the road apply to bicyclists who suddenly dart out into traffic from in front of a parked car. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment should have been granted:

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1143 provides that a driver entering or crossing a roadway “from any place other than another roadway shall yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the roadway to be entered or crossed.” Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1231 provides that every person riding a bicycle upon a roadway “shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this title.”

… [T]he defendants established … that the infant plaintiff negligently entered the roadway mid-block from in front of a parked van without yielding the right-of-way to the defendants’ vehicle, and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The evidence submitted in support of the motion, which included, inter alia, transcripts of the deposition testimony of the infant plaintiff, the defendant driver, and a nonparty witness, demonstrated that the defendant driver was traveling only 15 to 20 miles per hour, and had, at most, two seconds to react before the infant plaintiff’s bicycle struck the passenger side of the vehicle. Thus, the defendants demonstrated that the defendant driver was not negligent for failing to avoid colliding with the infant plaintiff … .  A. B. v Waring, 2023 NY Slip Op 04565, Second Dept 9-13-23

Practice Point: Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1231 applies all the duties of a vehicle-driver to bicyclists. Here the bicyclist violated the Vehicle and Traffic Law by suddenly entering the lane of traffic from in front of a parked van. The defendant driver was not negligent.

 

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