You are here: / / THE COVID EXECUTIVE ORDERS TOLLING THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLY TO...

THE COVID EXECUTIVE ORDERS TOLLING THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS APPLY TO THE TIME FOR ANSWERING A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN LIEU OF COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the COVID executive orders tolling the statute of limitations applied to the time to oppose a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint:

In Brash v Richards, this Court determined that Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders acted to toll those specific time limits contained in the CPLR and listed in the executive orders … . Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders “appear to apply to the service of the notice of appearance” … , but “do[ ] not expressly apply to toll the defendant’s time to serve an answer” … . However, given the hybrid nature of the “motion-action” under CPLR 3213, in which the filing of answering papers is akin to the service of a notice of appearance or an answer … , combined with the desire to preserve the status quo for litigants during the COVID-19 pandemic … , under Executive Order 202.8 and the subsequent executive orders, neither defendant was required to appear and file answering papers … . Blue Lagoon, LLC v Reisman, 2023 NY Slip Op 01657, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: COVID executive orders tolling statutes of limitations apply to the time to answer a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint.

 

You might also like
RPAPL 1304 AND 1302-a DO NOT APPLY WHERE THE LOAN SUBJECT TO FORECLOSURE IS NOT A “HOME LOAN;” COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1303 IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO FORECLOSURE BUT FAILURE TO COMPLY CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL; FAILURE TO PROVIDE NOTICE OF DEFAULT CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL (SECOND DEPT).
Elements of Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Abuse Finding, Based Upon an Unsatisfactory Explanation for the Child’s Injury, Reversed Based Upon the Testimony of Petitioner’s Medical Witness Who Stated the Injury Could Have Been Caused by a Fall and Described the Child as Basically Asymptomatic and Happy at the Hospital
DUPLICATE COVERAGE PROHIBITION IN SUPPLEMENTAL UNINSURED UNDERINSURED MOTORIST (SUM) ENDORSEMENT NOT VIOLATED WHERE OVERALL DAMAGES EXCEED AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE RECOVERED FROM SEVERAL TORTFEASORS.
PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL AS HE WALKED THROUGH A “ROOM,” NOT A “PASSAGEWAY;” THEREFORE THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION PROHIBITING OBSTRUCTIONS IN A “PASSAGEWAY” SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT). ​
Analytical Criteria Re: Res Judicata and the Interpretation of a Release Explained
EVEN CRIMINAL SLURS ARE NOT ACTIONABLE AS DEFAMATION IF THEY ARE PURE OPINION; HERE DEFENDANT’S TWEET ACCUSING PLAINTIFF OF MAKING “THREATS” WAS NOT ACTIONABLE (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THE PURPORTED TRANSFER BY DEED OF AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY TO A LIMITED LIABILTY COMPANY WAS NULL AND VOID FROM THE OUTSET BECAUSE THE LLC DID NOT EXIST WHEN THE DEED WAS EXECUTED; THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR REFORMATION OF THE DEED NEVER STARTED RUNNING; PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT THAT THE TRANSFER TO THE LLC WAS NULL AND VOID (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

PLAINTIFF WAS INVOLVED IN A COLLISION WHICH PUSHED HIS CAR INTO DEFENDANT’S... ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF PEDESTRIAN WAS STRUCK CROSSING THE STREET WHERE THERE WAS...