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FAMILY COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO MODIFY A SEPARATION AGREEMENT WHICH WAS INCORPORATED BUT NOT MERGED INTO THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE; A PLENARY ACTION IS REQUIRED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined Family Court did not have jurisdiction to modify the separation agreement by putting a cap on the child-support/spousal-support credit father was entitled to for his payment of the mortgage and apartment expenses:

A stipulation of settlement which is incorporated but not merged into the parties’ judgment of divorce may be reformed only in a plenary action … . Family Court does not have jurisdiction to modify a separation agreement … . Under the terms of the parties’ stipulation of settlement, the father is entitled to pay his $2,100 in monthly child support directly to the mortgagee of the parties’ former marital apartment. However, the Family Court erred in capping the father’s credit against support arrears at $25,200 per year based on this provision. Although Family Court found that there was no similar provision with respect to spousal support, in fact the parties’ stipulation permits the father to also deduct the payment of apartment expenses, including the mortgage, from his spousal support. Accordingly, Family Court improperly amended the stipulation by imposing an annual maximum credit to which the father is entitled based solely on his child support obligation. Matter of Deborah K. v Richard K., 2022 NY Slip Op 01391, First Dept 3-3-22

 

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