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THE SIX-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN WHEN THE LANDLORD COULD HAVE DEMANDED PAYMENT PURSUANT TO THE LEASE, NOT WHEN THE DEMAND WAS ACTUALLY MADE YEARS LATER (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract (here, a lease) started running when a demand for payment could have been made, not when the demand was actually made:

… [A]lthough the motion court awarded the entirety of the amounts of unpaid additional rent going back to 2006, the landlord’s inexplicable delay in asserting these counterclaims until September 13, 2019 rendered the amounts that accrued before September 13, 2013 time-barred (CPLR 213[2]). The law is well settled that the statute of limitations on breach of contract claims begin to run “when the party that was owed money had the right to demand payment, not when it actually made the demand” … . Because the limitations period cannot be extended “by simply failing to make a demand” … , the judgment must be reduced to include only those amounts that accrued on or after September 13, 2013, and we remand for the calculation of the proper award and commensurate reduction in statutory interest. Abarrotes Mixteca Corp., Inc. v Brisk, 2025 NY Slip Op 00034, First Dept 1-7-25

Practice Point: For a breach of contract, the statute of limitations begins to run when the party can demand payment pursuant to the contract, not when the demand is actually made. The statute of limitations cannot be extended by failing to make a demand.

 

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