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THIS ACTION WAS BROUGHT BY THE OWNERS OF RENTAL PROPERTIES IN THE DEFENDANT VILLAGE ALLEGING, AMONG OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION, VIOLATIONS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BY THE VILLAGE “NUISANCE LAW” WHICH WAS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT INFRINGED ON THE TENANTS’ RIGHT TO CALL THE POLICE (“NUISANCE POINTS” WERE ASSESSED FOR CALLS TO THE POLICE); THE ACTION BY THE RENTAL-PROPERTY OWNERS WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED (THIRD DEPT). ​

The Third Department affirmed the dismissal of this action brought by owners of rental properties in the defendant village asserting, among other causes of action, violations of their constitutional rights stemming from a local law (Nuisance Law) which was declared unconstitutional:

… [This court] declar[ed] that the Nuisance Law was “overbroad and facially invalid under the First Amendment” … . As to the finding of facial invalidity under the First Amendment, this Court held that, because the Nuisance Law did not prohibit the assessment of nuisance points against a property for police involvement thereat, the law violated the right of plaintiffs’ tenants to petition the government for redress of grievances by deterring them from calling the police in response to crimes committed at their properties … . * * *

… Supreme Court properly dismissed the first cause of action for malicious prosecution. * * *

As for the First Amendment claim, Supreme Court found …that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert their tenants’ constitutional rights. * * *

With respect to the selective enforcement claim, nothing in the record suggests that plaintiffs were singled out for enforcement of the Nuisance Law due to the population of tenants to which they rented — i.e., individuals whose rent was paid by the Tompkins County Department of Social Services. * * *

… [P]laintiffs’ due process claim, to the extent based upon defendants’ alleged failure to follow the procedures set forth in the Nuisance Law, is not actionable. Pirro v Board of Trustees of the Vil. of Groton, 2022 NY Slip Op 01358, Third Dept 3-3-22

 

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