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THE CONDITIONAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE DID NOT MEET THE CRITERIA OF CPLR 3216; THEREFORE THE MATTER SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMINISTRATIVELY DISMISSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the plaintiff’s motion to vacate the conditional order of dismissal should have been granted because the conditions in CPLR 3216 were not met by the order:

“CPLR 3216 permits a court, on its own initiative, to dismiss an action for want of prosecution where certain conditions precedent have been complied with” … . As relevant here, an action cannot be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3216(a) unless a written demand is served upon the party against whom such relief is sought in accordance with the statutory requirements, along with a statement that the default by the party upon whom such notice is served in complying with such demand within said ninety day period will serve as a basis for a motion by the party serving said demand for dismissal as against him or her for unreasonably neglecting to proceed … . “While a conditional order of dismissal may have the same effect as a valid 90-day notice pursuant to CPLR 3216” … , the conditional order of dismissal here “‘was defective in that it failed to state that the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the notice “will serve as a basis for a motion” by the court to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute'” … . The Supreme Court should not have administratively dismissed the action without further notice to the parties and without benefit of further judicial review … . Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Henry, 2020 NY Slip Op 07863, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

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