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Improper Notice of Benefit Termination; Four-Month S/L Never Triggered; Termination Annulled

The Second Department determined the four-month statute of limitations for Article 78 review was never triggered because the NYC Housing Authority’s (NYCHA’s) failed to provide proper notice of termination of Section 8 housing benefits.  Therefore the termination was properly annulled and the subsidy was properly reinstated:

Pursuant to paragraph 22(f) of the Williams first partial consent judgment, the four-month statute of limitations of CPLR 217 begins to run on the date of receipt of the NYCHA’s notice of default letter … . Paragraph 22(f) cannot be read in a vacuum. Relying on contract principles, as urged by the NYCHA, and reading the Williams first partial consent judgment as a whole, we conclude that the NYCHA has the burden of satisfying the condition precedent of serving all three notices upon the Section 8 participant before its determination to terminate a participant’s subsidy can be considered final and binding upon the participant … . * * *

Here, the NYCHA failed to show that it mailed two of the three required notices. It did not present any proof that it mailed the initial warning letter and it submitted insufficient proof with respect to the mailing of the T-1 letter. As a result of this failure to abide by the notice provisions set forth in the Williams first partial consent judgment, the statute of limitations was not properly triggered and did not begin to run … . Matter of Dial v Rhea, 2013 NY Slip Op 07475, 2nd Dept 11-13-13

 

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