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NEITHER THE LEVEL OF PLAYGROUND SUPERVISION NOR THE PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT CONSTITUTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE EXPERTISE RE: PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the school district’s motion for summary judgment in this playground student injury case should have been granted. Defendants demonstrated there was an adequate number of monitors supervising the children, infant plaintiff was using the equipment properly, and the equipment was in good working order. There was no showing that plaintiffs’ expert had any expertise re: playground equipment. Infant plaintiff slipped off a bar and fell because his hands were wet:

The defendants submitted evidence demonstrating, prima facie, that the level of supervision afforded to the infant plaintiff and the other students at the time of the accident was adequate… , and, in any event, that any alleged lack of supervision was not the proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries … . Furthermore, the defendants submitted a report and affidavit from their expert, which established that the playground equipment was appropriate for the infant plaintiff’s age group, and was not defective … .

In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Although the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit from their purported expert, there was no showing that the purported expert had any specialized knowledge, experience, training, or education regarding playground equipment so as to qualify him to render an opinion in this area … . Ponzini v Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist., 2018 NY Slip Op 08046, Second Dept 11-21-18

NEGLIGENCE (NEITHER THE LEVEL OF PLAYGROUND SUPERVISION, NOR THE PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT CONSTITUTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE EXPERTISE RE: PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, NEITHER THE LEVEL OF PLAYGROUND SUPERVISION, NOR THE PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT CONSTITUTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE EXPERTISE RE: PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEITHER THE LEVEL OF PLAYGROUND SUPERVISION, NOR THE PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT CONSTITUTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE EXPERTISE RE: PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EVIDENCE (EXPERT OPINION, EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEITHER THE LEVEL OF PLAYGROUND SUPERVISION, NOR THE PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT CONSTITUTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE EXPERTISE RE: PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))/EXPERT OPINION (NEGLIGENCE,  EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, NEITHER THE LEVEL OF PLAYGROUND SUPERVISION, NOR THE PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT CONSTITUTED THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL, PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE EXPERTISE RE: PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT, THE SCHOOL DISTRICT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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