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Failure to Identify in the Complaint and Bill of Particulars the Specific Code Provision(s) Alleged to Have Been Violated Is Not Fatal to a Labor Law 241(6) Cause of Action

The Second Department noted that the failure to identify, in the complaint and bill of particulars, the specific code provision alleged to have been violated (in support of a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action) is not a fatal defect:

Although a plaintiff asserting a Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action must allege a violation of a specific and concrete provision of the Industrial Code …, the failure to identify the code provision in the complaint or bill of particulars is not fatal to such a claim … . Here, the plaintiff’s belated allegations that Cook violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.21(b)(1), 23-1.21(b)(3)(i), 23-1.21(b)(3)(iv), 23-1.21(b)(4)(ii), and 23-1.21(e)(2) involved no new factual allegations, raised no new theories of liability, and caused no prejudice … . Moreover, these code provisions set forth specific, rather than general, safety standards, and are sufficient to support a Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action … . Przyborowski v A&M Cook LLC, 2014 NY Slip Op 05852, 2nd Dept 8-20-14

 

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