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You are here: Home1 / Contract Law2 / THE PROPERTY OWNER SUED THE VILLAGE ALLEGING THE VILLAGE BREACHED A CONTRACT...
Contract Law, Municipal Law

THE PROPERTY OWNER SUED THE VILLAGE ALLEGING THE VILLAGE BREACHED A CONTRACT IN FAILING TO RE-ZONE THE PROPERTY TO ALLOW DEVELOPMENT; A MUNICIPALITY DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER A CONTRACT WHICH CONTROLS ITS LEGISLATIVE POWERS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the cause of action by plaintiff property owner alleging the defendant village breached a contract to rezone the property to allow development should have been dismissed. A municipality does not have the authority to make contracts which control legislative powers and duties:

Even were we to find that the stipulations contained a provision that required the Village Board to enact zoning, such a provision is unenforceable, as obligating the Village Board to enact certain zoning requiring a legislative act cannot be agreed to by stipulation. “While a municipality possesses the inherent right to compromise a claim against it, it may not, under the guise of a compromise, impair a public duty owed by it or give validity to a void claim. Municipal corporations have no power to make contracts which will embarrass or control them in the performance of their legislative powers and duties” … . Moreover, “[t]he term limits rule prohibits one municipal body from contractually binding its successors in areas relating to governance unless specifically authorized by statute or charter provisions to do so. Elected officials must be free to exercise legislative and governmental powers in accordance with their own discretion and ordinarily may not do so in a manner that limits the same discretionary right of their successors to exercise those powers” … . BT Holdings, LLC v Village of Chester, 2020 NY Slip Op 07157, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

December 2, 2020
Tags: Second Department
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https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 Bruce Freeman https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png Bruce Freeman2020-12-02 10:56:352020-12-05 11:23:57THE PROPERTY OWNER SUED THE VILLAGE ALLEGING THE VILLAGE BREACHED A CONTRACT IN FAILING TO RE-ZONE THE PROPERTY TO ALLOW DEVELOPMENT; A MUNICIPALITY DOES NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ENTER A CONTRACT WHICH CONTROLS ITS LEGISLATIVE POWERS (SECOND DEPT).
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