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RETROACTIVE IMPOSTION OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL SEX OFFENDER VICTIM FEE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Christopher, determined the retroactive imposition of the supplemental sex offender victim fee did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the US Constitution. The fee was deemed to have a revenue-generating purpose, not a punitive purpose, and was not so punitive in effect as to negate the revenue-generating purpose. The court noted two two decisions (People v Bradshaw, 76 AD3d 566, People v Diggs, 73 AD3d 1210).should no longer be followed:

… [A] review of the legislative history of the 2004 amendment pursuant to which the supplemental sex offender victim fee was added to Penal Law § 60.35, reveals that it was part of an act entitled “Appropriations-Budgets,” that enacted “into law major components of legislation which are necessary to implement the state fiscal plan for the 2004-2005 state fiscal year” … . …

Next, we proceed to the second step of the inquiry, and consider whether the statute is punitive in effect … . In so doing, we consider the following factors articulated in Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez (372 US 144): “[1] whether the sanction involved an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned” … . People v Bradshaw, 2022 NY Slip Op 05216, Second Dept 9-21-22

Practice Point: Retroactive imposition of the supplemental sex offender victim fee does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause. The purpose of the fee is to generate revenue, not to punish. The fee is not so punitive in nature as to negate its revenue-generating purpose.

 

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