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STUDENT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT AT A COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY HEARING BY THE COLLEGE’S REFUSAL TO ADJOURN THE MATTER FOR THREE HOURS SO THE ATTORNEY COULD ATTEND, STUDENT WAS PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND WAS PROPERLY EXPELLED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the student-petitioner's due process rights were not violated when the state college (SUNY Purchase] refused to adjourn a disciplinary hearing because petitioner's attorney could not be present. Petitioner was accused of having sex with another student without her consent. After the hearing the petitioner was found responsible and expelled. The dissent argued that the failure to grant the requested three-hour adjournment so petitioner's counsel could attend the hearing deprived petitioner of due process:

In disciplinary proceedings at public colleges, ” [d]ue process requires that the [accused students] be given the names of the witnesses against them, the opportunity to present a defense, and the results and finding of the hearing'” …  Due process does not require colleges to provide accused students with legal representation at disciplinary hearings … . Purchase's rules, the legality of which the petitioner does not challenge, allow for an attorney to be present and advise an accused student at a disciplinary hearing, but not to represent the student or interact with anyone at the hearing other than the accused student. Here, the petitioner had hired an attorney as of September 30, 2014. … [t]he petitioner was notified on September 30, 2014, that the hearing would likely be scheduled for October 6 or 7, and was informed of the exact time of the hearing on October 2, 2014. He alleges that he did not request an adjournment until “on or about” October 5, 2014, which was two days before the date of the hearing. Under these circumstances, contrary to the suggestion of our dissenting colleagues, the petitioner was not denied the opportunity to have an attorney present at the hearing … .

Purchase's determination that the petitioner committed the charged violations was supported by substantial evidence (see CPLR 7803[4]…).

Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the penalty of expulsion was not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law (see CPLR 7803[3]…). Matter of Bursch v Purchase Coll. of the State Univ. of N.Y., 2018 NY Slip Op 06090, Second Dept 9-19-18

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (STUDENT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT AT A COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY HEARING BY THE COLLEGE'S REFUSAL TO ADJOURN THE MATTER FOR THREE HOURS SO THE ATTORNEY COULD ATTEND, STUDENT WAS PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND WAS PROPERLY EXPELLED (SECOND DEPT))/ATTORNEYS (EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW, STUDENT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT AT A COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY HEARING BY THE COLLEGE'S REFUSAL TO ADJOURN THE MATTER FOR THREE HOURS SO THE ATTORNEY COULD ATTEND, STUDENT WAS PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND WAS PROPERLY EXPELLED (SECOND DEPT))/COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (DISCIPLINARY CHARGES, STUDENT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT AT A COLLEGE DISCIPLINARY HEARING BY THE COLLEGE'S REFUSAL TO ADJOURN THE MATTER FOR THREE HOURS SO THE ATTORNEY COULD ATTEND, STUDENT WAS PROPERLY FOUND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND WAS PROPERLY EXPELLED (SECOND DEPT))

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