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THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank (Wilmington) did not demonstrate defendants’ default in this foreclosure action and the bank’s motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

Wilmington failed to establish, prima facie, its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as it failed to submit evidence demonstrating the defendants’ default in payment … . In support of the motion, Wilmington submitted … copies of the note and the mortgage, and the affidavit of Angela Farmer, a vice president of Rushmore Loan Management Services, LLC (hereinafter Rushmore), the servicer of the loan. Based on her review of business records in the possession of Rushmore, including records created by Ditech [the original plaintiff, note was transferred to Wilmington], Farmer averred that the defendants defaulted in payment in June 2013. While Farmer established that she was familiar with Ditech’s recordkeeping practices and procedures, no payment records were proffered with the motion. The only business records annexed and incorporated in the affidavit with regard to the default were two notices of default both dated October 24, 2013 … . “‘[W]hile a witness may read into the record from the contents of a document which has been admitted into evidence, a witness’s description of a document not admitted into evidence is hearsay'” … . “[I]t is the business record itself, not the foundational affidavit, that serves as proof of the matter asserted” … . Wilmington Sav. Fund, FSB v Peters, 020 NY Slip Op 07248, Second Dept 12-2-20

 

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THE BANK’S DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING... THE PROPERTY OWNER SUED THE VILLAGE ALLEGING THE VILLAGE BREACHED A CONTRACT...