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IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION THE BANK MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WHICH REQUIRES PROOF PAPERS WERE FILED WITHIN THREE BUSINESS DAYS OF MAILING THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE OF DEFAULT; HERE THERE WAS NO PROOF WHEN THE RPAPL 1304 NOTICE WAS MAILED, SO THE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH RPAPL 1306 WAS INSUFFICIENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined summary judgment dismissing an affirmative defense (alleging failure to comply with RPAPL 1306) should not have been granted to the plaintiff in this foreclosure action. Because there was no proof of when the notice of default required by RPAPL 1304 was mailed, proof that plaintiff had filed papers with the superintendent of financial services pursuant to RPAPL 1306 was insufficient. RPAPL 1306 requires filing within three business days of mailing the RPAPL 1304 notice. But the date of mailing was not proven:

… [I]n the absence of evidence establishing when the plaintiff mailed the notices required by RPAPL 1304, the plaintiff could not establish, as a matter of law, that it complied with the requirement of RPAPL 1306 to file with the superintendent of financial services within three business days of the mailing of the notice required by RPAPL 1304. Thus, the court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing so much of the defendant’s fifth affirmative defense as alleged a failure to comply with RPAPL 1306…. . PROF-2013-S3 Legal Title Trust V v Johnson, 2023 NY Slip Op 01204, Second Dept 3-8-23

Practice Point: In a foreclosure action, if there is no proof when the RPAPL 1304 notice of default was mailed, the bank can’t prove the papers filed pursuant to RPAPL 1306 were filed within three business days of mailing the RPAPL 1304 notice (which is a requirement of strict compliance with RPAPL 1306).

 

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