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DEFENDANT SOLE SHAREHOLDER OF DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ACTION AGAINST HIM PREMISED UPON PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL, THERE WERE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE WARRANTY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACT WERE VIOLATED AND WHETHER DEFENDANT CORPORATION WAS STRIPPED OF ASSETS SUCH THAT IT COULD NOT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, over a partial dissent, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined that defendant Brookstein, the sole shareholder of corporate defendant DKM, was not entitled to summary judgment in the action against him based upon piercing the corporate veil:

“The general rule, of course, is that a corporation exists independently of its owners, who are not personally liable for its obligations, and that individuals may incorporate for the express purpose of limiting their liability… . The concept of piercing the corporate veil is an exception to this general rule, permitting, in certain circumstances, the imposition of personal liability on owners for the obligations of their corporation … . A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil must demonstrate that a court in equity should intervene because the owners of the corporation exercised complete domination over [the corporation] in the transaction at issue and, in doing so, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form, thereby perpetrating a wrong that resulted in injury to the plaintiff … .

A plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil bears a heavy burden… . “Veil-piercing is a fact-laden claim that is not well suited for summary judgment resolution” … .

Here, Brookstein did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him. It is undisputed that Brookstein dissolved DKM without making any reserves for contingent liabilities, despite the existence of a provision in the contract of sale pursuant to which DKM agreed to indemnify [plaintiff] for any breach of warranty for a period of 7½ years after the closing of the sale. This factor was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Brookstein stripped the corporation of assets, leaving DKM without sufficient funds to pay its contractual contingent liabilities … . Town-Line Car Wash, Inc. v Don’s Kleen Mach. Kar Wash, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 01443, Second Dept 2-27-19

 

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BECAUSE SOME OF THE ACTS CRIMINALIZED IN THE FLORIDA STATUTE CONSTITUTE NEW YORK VIOLENT FELONIES AND SOME DO NOT, THE FLORIDA ACCUSATORY INSTRUMENT MUST BE CONSULTED TO DETERMINE THE PRECISE ACTS INVOLVED; THE SECOND VIOLENT FELONY OFFENDER ADJUDICATION WAS VACATED AND THE MATTER WAS SENT BACK FOR A HEARING (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE SUMMONED A NECESSARY PARTY WHICH WAS SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT PURSUANT TO CPLR 1001; SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO SERVE A DEFENDANT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, DESPITE THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND LAW-OFFICE-FAILURE EXCUSE (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF SUED BOTH THE COUNTY AND THE SHERIFF FOR ALLEGED EXPOSURE TO CONTAMINATED WATER IN THE SHOWER AT THE JAIL; THE ACTION AGAINST THE COUNTY WAS NOT BROUGHT UNDER A VICARIOUS LIABILITY THEORY (THE COUNTY IS NOT VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR THE ACTS OR OMISSIONS OF THE SHERIFF); RATHER THE CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGED THE COUNTY WAS NEGLIGENT IN ITS OWN RIGHT (SECOND DEPT).
MOTION TO AMEND THE CAPTION TO CORRECT THE NAMES OF THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
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Denial of Guilt to Department of Probation (DOP) Was Not a Violation of a Condition that Defendant Cooperate With the DOP

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