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PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 230 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS REPORTING OF INSURANCE FRAUD BY A PHYSICIAN TO THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CONDUCT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, determined that Public Health Law 230 (11) (b) does not create a private right of action. Plaintiff surgeon provided medical care to four patients injured in an automobile accident and submitted claims for payment to the defendant insurer. The insurer fully or partially denied the claims and then filed complaints against plaintiff with the Office of Professional Medical Conduct (OPMC) alleging insurance fraud. The OPMC declined to discipline plaintiff. Plaintiff then sued defendant insurer for bad-faith and malicious reporting in violation of Public Health Law 230 (11) (b). The Court of Appeals noted a split of authority in the 1st and 2nd Departments re: whether a violation of this statute give rise to a private right of action:

Public Health Law § 230 (11) (b) does not expressly create a cause of action authorizing licensees to commence civil litigation against a complainant that files an allegedly bad-faith and/or malicious report with OPMC (compare Public Health Law § 230 [10] [j] [creating an express right to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding in certain instances]). Consequently, “recovery may be had . . . only if a legislative intent to create such a right of action is fairly implied in the statutory provision[] and [its] legislative history” … . …

We have consistently identified three “essential factors” to be considered in determining whether a private right of action can be fairly implied from the statutory text and legislative history: “(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme”… . Critically, all three factors must be satisfied before an implied private right of action will be recognized … . Applying these factors here, we conclude that the legislature did not intend to create a right of action under Public Health Law § 230 (11) (b). Haar v Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2019 NY Slip Op 08445, CtApp 11-21-19

 

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