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PLEA TO ASSAULT FIRST WAS DEFECTIVE BECAUSE THE INTENT TO INFLICT SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURY WAS NOT STATED IN THE ALLOCUTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing the judgment, determined the plea to assault first was defective because the intent to inflict serious physical injury was not stated in the allocution:

During the plea colloquy, the Supreme Court stated, and the defendant admitted, the elements of assault in the first degree as including an intent to inflict physical injury and conduct which in fact causes physical injury. However, the crime of assault in the first degree, as defined in Penal Law § 120.10(1), requires an intent to inflict serious physical injury and conduct which in fact causes serious physical injury. Under the circumstances, since the defendant admitted harboring an intent and inflicting an injury other than those required for the commission of assault in the first degree, the defendant’s plea of guilty must be vacated, as her allocution failed to make out the requisite elements of that crime … . People v Steele-Warrick, 2019 NY Slip Op 08428, Second Dept 11-20-19

 

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