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Starbuck’s Tip-Splitting Policy Analyzed

The Second Circuit asked the Court of Appeals to answer certified questions about how the Labor Law relates to a tip-splitting policy used by Starbucks.  Over two dissents, the Court of Appeals determined, under the Labor Law, limited supervisory duties did not mandate exclusion from the tip pool:

Starbucks maintains a written policy governing the collection, storage and distribution of customer tips. Pursuant to this policy, each Starbucks store places a plexiglass container at the counter where patrons may deposit tips. Once these tip canisters become full, Starbucks requires that they be emptied into a bag and the money is stored in a safe. At the end of each week, the tips are tallied and distributed in cash to two categories of employees — baristas and shift supervisors — in proportion to the number of hours each employee worked. Starbucks does not permit its assistant store managers or store managers to share in the weekly distribution of tips. The company’s decision to include shift supervisors in these tip pools was the impetus for the first lawsuit before us, while its exclusion of assistant store managers underlies the claims in the second action. * * *

…[A]n employee whose personal service to patrons is a principal or regular part of his or her duties may participate in an employer-mandated tip allocation arrangement under Labor Law § 196-d, even if that employee possesses limited supervisory responsibilities. But an employee granted meaningful authority or control over subordinates can no longer be considered similar to waiters and busboys within the meaning of section 196-d and, consequently, is not eligible to participate in a tip pool. * * *

…Starbucks’ decision to exclude assistant store managers from the tip pool is not contrary to Labor Law § 196-d.  Barenboim, et al v Starbucks Corporation, No 122, CtApp 6-26-13

 

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