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QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE BUS STOPPED IN AN UNUSUAL AND VIOLENT WAY IN THIS COMMON CARRIER INJURY CASE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there was a question of fact about whether the bus on which plaintiff was a passenger stopped in an unusual and violent way, injuring her:

To prevail on a cause of action alleging that a common carrier was negligent in stopping a bus, a plaintiff must prove that the stop was unusual and violent, rather than merely one of the sort of “jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel” … . Moreover, a plaintiff may not satisfy that burden of proof merely by characterizing the stop as unusual and violent … . “However, in seeking summary judgment dismissing such a cause of action, common carriers have the burden of establishing, prima facie, that the stop was not unusual and violent” … .

… According to the plaintiff’s testimony, shortly after she paid her fare, the bus “took off” and then came to a quick stop, causing her to fall. According to the testimony of the bus driver, he was operating the bus at about 15 miles per hour when a vehicle cut in front of him, causing him to apply the brakes and stop the bus. Under the circumstances, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the stop of the bus was unusual and violent … . Brown v New York City Tr. Auth., 2019 NY Slip Op 05759, Second Dept 7-24-19

 

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