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BECAUSE THE COURT WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PLACE PETITIONER IN CUSTODY, THE COURT COULD NOT ORDER PETITIONER TO BE REMANDED TO RIKER’S ISLAND FOR A CPL ARTICLE 730 EXAMINATION; THE HABEAS CORPUS PETITION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department determined Supreme Court was not authorized to remand the petitioner, Wei Li, to Riker’s Island for a CPL article 730 examination because defendant was charged with a misdemeanor and was not in custody. Therefore the habeas corpus petition should have been granted:

… [T]he references in CPL 730.20(2) and (3) to the defendant either having been theretofore released on bail or on his or her own recognizance, or being in custody, respectively, at the time a court issues an order of examination presuppose that a securing order has been issued upon arraignment as required by law (see CPL 170.10[7]; 210.15[6]; 510.10[1]). As such, a defendant’s previously determined, or statutorily mandated, liberty status—either release or in custody—cannot be changed because a CPL article 730 examination is ordered: if the defendant has been ordered released (or, as in the case of non-qualifying offenses, is required to be released), then the court is authorized (“may “) only to direct that the examination be conducted on an outpatient basis or, under certain circumstances, that the defendant be confined in a hospital until the examination is completed (see CPL 730.20[2]); if the defendant has been committed to custody, then he or she must remain in custody for the examination, even if he or she must be taken to a hospital for purposes of conducting same (see id. § 730.20[3]). A defendant who has been ordered released, or, as in Wei Li’s case, was statutorily entitled to release (see CPL 510.10[3]; 530.20[1]), cannot be jailed because the court ordered a CPL article 730 examination. People v Warden, 2021 NY Slip Op 03867, Second Dept 6-16-21

 

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