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COUNTY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS ACTION FOR SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF DEFENDANT’S VEHICLE AFTER A DWI CONVICTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, THE COUNTY DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COUNTY CODE (SECOND DEPT).

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The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the county’s motion for summary judgment in its action to seize defendant’s vehicle pursuant to the Nassau County Administrative Code after a DWI conviction (Vehicle and Traffic Law 1192) should not have been granted. The county did not comply with the notice requirements of the code:

…. [T]he complaint, as amplified by the plaintiff’s submissions establishing that the defendant pleaded guilty to a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192, stated a cause of action for civil forfeiture of the vehicle pursuant to Nassau County Administrative Code § 8-7.0(g)(4) … . Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court’s denial of the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her. However, in opposition to the plaintiff’s showing of its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the defendant raised a triable issue of fact by adducing evidence demonstrating that, while she was given a copy of the notice of seizure in person, the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement of Nassau County Administrative Code § 8-7.0(g)(4)(a) that she also be served with the notice of seizure by certified mail, return receipt requested … . Accordingly, the court should have denied the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment awarding civil forfeiture of the vehicle. County of Nassau v Urban, 2019 NY Slip Op 05762, Second Dept 7-24-19

 

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