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PLAINTIFF PRESENTED ONLY SPECULATION ABOUT THE CAUSE OF HER SLIP AND FALL, LANDLORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that the landlord’s motion for summary judgment in this slip and fall case should have been granted because plaintiff could not identify the cause of her fall:

… [T]he landlord met her prima facie burden on her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint by submitting the plaintiff’s deposition transcript which demonstrated, prima facie, that she was unable to identify the cause of her fall without resorting to speculation … . The plaintiff’s theory that she slipped on water dripping from the ceiling was speculative in light of, inter alia, her deposition testimony that she “personally didn’t see any water dripping, but there must have been a drip from the ceiling because the ground was wet.” Moreover, [third-party defendant] testified at his deposition that, although there had been a prior water leak coming from the ceiling into the kitchen, that leak was not near the location of the plaintiff’s accident. Bilska v Truszkowski, 2019 NY Slip Op 02490, Second Dept 4-3-19

 

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DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND... DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL...