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WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the action against the city as owner of the sidewalk where plaintiff slipped and fell on ice should have been dismissed because the city did not have written notice of the condition:

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Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201(c) “limits the City’s duty of care over municipal streets and sidewalks by imposing liability only for those defects or hazardous conditions which its officials have been actually notified exist at a specified location” … . Accordingly, “prior written notice of a defect is a condition precedent which plaintiff is required to plead and prove to maintain an action against the City” … . The only recognized exceptions to the prior written notice requirement involve situations in which either the municipality created the defect through an affirmative act of negligence, or a special use confers a special benefit upon the municipality … . Neither exception is applicable here. “Transitory conditions present on a roadway or walkway such as debris, oil, ice, or sand have been found to constitute potentially dangerous conditions for which prior written notice must be given before liability may be imposed upon a municipality” … . Puzhayeva v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 05107, 2nd Dept 6-21-17

MUNICIPAL LAW (NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, SIDEWALKS, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/NEGLIGENCE (MUNICIPAL LAW, WRITTEN NOTICE, SIDEWALKS, ICE, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/SIDEWALKS (SLIP AND FALL, MUNICIPAL LAW, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/SIDEWALKS (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, SLIP AND FALL, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)/WRITTEN NOTICE (MUNICIPAL LAW, NEGLIGENCE, SIDEWALKS, WRITTEN NOTICE AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CITY LIABILITY APPLIES EVEN TO TRANSITORY CONDITIONS, HERE ICE ON THE SIDEWALK, SLIP AND FALL ACTION AGAINST CITY SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED)

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