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DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE WHEN THE AREA WHERE PLAINTIFF SLIPPED AND FELL WAS LAST INSPECTED OR CLEANED, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPERLY DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined defendant did not demonstrate a lack of constructive notice of the sand and debris in a walkway in this slip and fall case. Therefore their motions for summary judgment were properly denied:

 “Mere reference to general cleaning practices, with no evidence regarding any specific cleaning or inspection of the area in question, is insufficient to establish a lack of constructive notice” … . [Defendant’s] submissions in support of its motion failed to demonstrate, prima facie, a lack of constructive notice. The affidavit of its association president merely referenced his general inspection practices and failed to indicate when the area of the walkway where the alleged slip and fall occurred was last inspected or cleaned relative to the accident … . Butts v SJF, LLC, 2019 NY Slip Op 02491, Second Dept 4-3-19

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