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PLAINTIFF’S PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW 1304 IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WAS INSUFFICIENT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff did not demonstrate compliance with the notice requirements of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) 1304:

… [T]he plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or proof of mailing by the United States Postal Service evidencing that it properly served the defendant pursuant to RPAPL 1304. The plaintiff instead relied on the “Affidavit of Mailing” of a vice president of loan documentation of Wells Fargo. However, the affiant did not aver that she personally mailed the notice, and she did not aver that she was familiar with the plaintiff’s mailing practices and procedures, and, therefore, she did not establish proof of a standard office practice and procedure designed to ensure that items are properly addressed and mailed …. Similarly, the presence of numbered bar codes on the copies of the 90-day statutory notices submitted by the plaintiff did not suffice to establish, prima facie, proper mailing under RPAPL 1304 … . U.S. Bank N.A. v Offley, 2019 NY Slip Op 02377, Second Dept 3-27-19

 

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