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You are here: Home1 / Civil Procedure2 / SUPREMACY CLAUSE DOES NOT PRECLUDE DEFAMATION SUIT AGAINST PRESIDENT TRUMP...
Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Defamation

SUPREMACY CLAUSE DOES NOT PRECLUDE DEFAMATION SUIT AGAINST PRESIDENT TRUMP FOR STATEMENTS MADE WHILE A CANDIDATE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Renwick, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the Supremacy Clause did not preclude a New York State civil suit for defamation against President Trump. In response to allegations by the plaintiff that Donald Trump had made unwanted sexual advances, then candidate Trump made statements denying the allegations (made by plaintiff and other women), calling them false and outright lies saying, for example, “all of these liars will be sued after the election is over:”

… [T]he current sitting President attempts to shield himself from consequences for his alleged unofficial misconduct by relying upon the constitutional protection of the Presidency. We reject defendant President Trump’s argument that the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution prevents a New York State court – and every other state court in the country – from exercising its authority under its state constitution. Instead, we find that the Supremacy Clause was never intended to deprive a state court of its authority to decide cases and controversies under the state’s constitution.

… [T]he Supremacy Clause provides that federal law supersedes state law with which it conflicts, but it does not provide that the President himself is immune from state law that does not conflict with federal law. Since there is no federal law conflicting with or displacing this defamation action, the Supremacy Clause does not provide a basis for immunizing the President from state court civil damages actions. Moreover, in the absence of a federal law limiting state court jurisdiction, state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Thus, it follows that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over defendant and properly denied his motion to dismiss. Zervos v Trump, 2019 NY Slip Op 01851, First Dept 3-14-19

 

March 14, 2019
Tags: First Department
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