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A JUDGE CANNOT ORDER DISCOVERY IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION WHICH IS A SIGNATORY TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CONVENTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have ordered discovery of a nonparty’s electronic devices in a foreign jurisdiction without complying with the Hague Convention. The nonparty, de Putron, resides in the island country of Jersey in the United Kingdom:

… Supreme Court improperly directed the discovery of de Putron’s electronic devices. First, “when discovery is sought from a nonparty in a foreign jurisdiction [that is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters … , application of the . . . Convention . . . is virtually compulsory” … . An order directing discovery of such a party without complying with the Hague Convention is therefore an “improper assertion of power beyond the . . . Court’s jurisdiction” … . As it is undisputed that de Putron is a nonparty in a foreign jurisdiction that is a signatory to the Hague Convention, Supreme Court lacked the power to direct discovery of his electronic devices without complying with the Hague Convention. Dorilton Capital Mgt. LLC v Stilus LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 05744, First Dept 10-16-25

Practice Point: Here discovery of a foreign nonparty’s electronic devices was improperly ordered by the judge. The country in which the nonparty resided was a signatory to the Hague Convention. Compliance with the Convention is a prerequisite to any discovery order.

 

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