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PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED WORKING ON AN HVAC SYSTEM, THE WORK WAS ROUTINE MAINTENANCE, NOT COVERED BY LABOR LAW 241 (1) (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s work on an HVAC system was routing maintenance, not covered by Labor Law 241 (6):

The plaintiff allegedly injured his back when he was performing a seasonal “start-up” of a cooling tower on the defendant’s HVAC system, which consisted of transitioning the HVAC system from heating to cooling. The company the defendant was employed by had done this work on a yearly basis for the past 10 years. As part of the work, the plaintiff and his coworker needed to reinstall a circulation pump on the HVAC tower, which had been removed for the winter months. To do so, the plaintiff tied a rope around the circulation pump, which weighed approximately 100 pounds, passed the rope over the top of an overhead beam, and pulled from the other side to raise the pump about three to five feet off the ground so his coworker could install it in the cooling tower. The plaintiff held the pump in the air for about 20 or 25 minutes while his coworker attempted to install it, but felt pain in his back and was unable to hold it any longer. The plaintiff allegedly needed back surgery as a result of the incident. …

Although maintenance work performed in connection with construction, demolition, or excavation work is included under Labor Law § 241(6), “[r]outine maintenance is not within the ambit of Labor Law § 241(6)” … . The Labor Law “does not cover routine maintenance in a nonconstruction, nonrenovation context” … . Byrnes v Nursing Sisters of the Sick Poor, Inc., 2019 NY Slip Op 01736, Second Dept 3-13-19

 

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