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THE ACTION, WHICH STEMMED FROM PLAINTIFF’S BEING DROPPED IN THE DELIVERY ROOM IMMEDIATELY AFTER BIRTH, SOUNDED IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, NOT NEGLIGENCE, AND WAS THEREFORE TIME-BARRED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff’s action, which stemmed from being dropped in the delivery room immediately after birth in 1999, sounded in medical malpractice, not negligence, and was therefore time-barred:

CPLR 208 provides that the statute of limitations is tolled throughout the period of infancy, but limits such toll to 10 years in medical malpractice actions … . In determining whether conduct should be deemed medical malpractice or ordinary negligence, the critical factor is the nature of the duty owed to the plaintiff that the defendant is alleged to have breached … . A negligent act or omission by a health care provider that constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician to a particular patient constitutes medical malpractice … .

Here, the defendant established … the conduct at issue derived from the duty owed to plaintiff by the defendant as a result of the physician-patient relationship and was substantially related to the plaintiff’s medical treatment … . Rojas v Tandon, 2022 NY Slip Op 04989, Second Dept 8-17-22

Practice Point: The infancy toll of the statute of limitations in CPLR 208 is limited to ten years in medical malpractice cases. Here plaintiff alleged she was dropped in the delivery room immediately after birth in 1999. The action would have been timely if it sounded in negligence. But the action was deemed to sound in medical malpractice rendering it time-barred.

 

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HERE DEFENDANT, WHO PLED GUILTY TO BURGLARY AS A SEXUALLY MOTIVATED FELONY,... CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION REQUIRED DENIAL...