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BANK’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT’S ORDER TO MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WITHIN 60 DAYS DID NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the bank’s failure to comply with the court’s order to move for summary judgment within 60 days could not be the basis for dismissal for neglect to prosecute, which requires a 90-day notice:

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“A court may not dismiss an action based on neglect to prosecute unless the statutory preconditions to dismissal, as articulated in CPLR 3216, are met” … . The September order could not be deemed a 90-day demand pursuant to CPLR 3216 because it gave US Bank only 60 days within which to file a motion for summary judgment (see CPLR 3216[b][3]). Since the dismissal order … , merely effectuated the September order, which did not meet the statutory preconditions set forth in CPLR 3216, there was a failure of a condition precedent, and the Supreme Court was not authorized to dismiss the action on its own motion … . In any event, there was no evidence that the plaintiff intended to abandon the action, that the default was willful, or that the defendants were prejudiced … . US Bank, N.A. v Mizrahi, 2017 NY Slip Op 08548, Second Dept 12-6-17

 

CIVIL PROCEDURE (NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE, BANK’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT’S ORDER TO MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WITHIN 60 DAYS DID NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT))/NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE (BANK’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT’S ORDER TO MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WITHIN 60 DAYS DID NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT))/FORECLOSURE (NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE, BANK’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT’S ORDER TO MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WITHIN 60 DAYS DID NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT))/CPLR 3216 (NEGLECT TO PROSECUTE, BANK’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT’S ORDER TO MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION WITHIN 60 DAYS DID NOT SUPPORT DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE PURSUANT TO CPLR 3216 (SECOND DEPT))

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