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ALTHOUGH A TYPED NAME ON AN EMAIL MAY SUFFICE AS A SIGNATURE FOR STATUTE OF FRAUD PURPOSES, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE FOR AN ATTACHMENT TO AN EMAIL, WHICH CAN EASILY BE SIGNED BY THE SENDER (THIRD DEPT).

The Third Department, in a comprehensive “offer and acceptance” decision too detailed to fairly summarize here, determined that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this breach of a real estate contract action was properly granted on statute of frauds grounds. Although a typed name on an email is the equivalent of a signature, the same is not true for an attachment to an email, which can easily be signed by the sender. Here plaintiff’s breach of contract theory depended upon an attachment to an email sent by the defendant to the plaintiff. Because the attachment was not signed, there was no contract:

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Under ESRA [Electronic Signatures and Records Act}, plaintiff would have a viable argument that defendant signed the emails she sent, as they are electronic records and she typed her name at the end of each. As confirmed at oral argument, however, plaintiff does not contend that the emails constituted signed documents forming the contract, but that defendant’s typed name at the end of the proposed side letter constituted her signature. That document was separately typed and attached to emails for transmission. Although emails are electronic records, not every attachment to an email qualifies as an electronic record under ESRA. One of the purposes of ESRA is “to promote the use of electronic technology in the everyday lives and transactions” of government entities, businesses and average citizens… . To fulfill this purpose, it was necessary for the Legislature to permit emails to be considered equivalent to signed writings when that was the sender’s intent … , because it was not possible to place a handwritten signature on an email or similar electronic record that was being transmitted electronically.

The same logic does not apply to ordinary typed documents that are scanned and attached to emails, because a party could easily affix a handwritten signature to those documents. Solartech Renewables, LLC v Vitti, 2017 NY Slip Op 08574, Third Dept 12-6-17

 

CONTRACT LAW (STATUTE OF FRAUDS, EMAILS, ALTHOUGH A TYPED NAME ON AN EMAIL MAY SUFFICE AS A SIGNATURE FOR STATUTE OF FRAUD PURPOSES, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE FOR AN ATTACHMENT TO AN EMAIL, WHICH CAN EASILY BE SIGNED BY THE SENDER (THIRD DEPT))/STATUTE OF FRAUDS (EMAILS, ATTACHMENTS, ALTHOUGH A TYPED NAME ON AN EMAIL MAY SUFFICE AS A SIGNATURE FOR STATUTE OF FRAUD PURPOSES, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE FOR AN ATTACHMENT TO AN EMAIL, WHICH CAN EASILY BE SIGNED BY THE SENDER (THIRD DEPT))/EMAILS (CONTRACT LAW, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, ALTHOUGH A TYPED NAME ON AN EMAIL MAY SUFFICE AS A SIGNATURE FOR STATUTE OF FRAUD PURPOSES, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE FOR AN ATTACHMENT TO AN EMAIL, WHICH CAN EASILY BE SIGNED BY THE SENDER (THIRD DEPT))/ATTACHMENTS (EMAILS, CONTRACT LAW, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, ALTHOUGH A TYPED NAME ON AN EMAIL MAY SUFFICE AS A SIGNATURE FOR STATUTE OF FRAUD PURPOSES, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE FOR AN ATTACHMENT TO AN EMAIL, WHICH CAN EASILY BE SIGNED BY THE SENDER (THIRD DEPT))/ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND RECORDS ACT (CONTRACT LAW, EMAILS, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, ALTHOUGH A TYPED NAME ON AN EMAIL MAY SUFFICE AS A SIGNATURE FOR STATUTE OF FRAUD PURPOSES, THE SAME IS NOT TRUE FOR AN ATTACHMENT TO AN EMAIL, WHICH CAN EASILY BE SIGNED BY THE SENDER (THIRD DEPT))

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