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COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS.

MUNICIPAL LAW, EMPLOYMENT LAW.

The Second Department, interpreting the Public Authorities Law, determined Nassau County had the authority to impose a wage freeze on county employees to address a financial crisis:

… [W]e find that, contrary to the … petitioners’ contention, the Supreme Court correctly determined that NIFA [Nassau County Interim Finance Authority] was authorized under the NIFA Act to impose the subject wage freezes (see Public Authorities Law § 3669[3]). Public Authorities Law § 3669(3) expressly provides for NIFA’s authority to declare a control period by enacting a resolution finding a fiscal crisis, and upon such finding, order that all increases in salary or wages of county employees be suspended. Control periods may be declared “at any time” (Public Authorities Law § 3669[1]). Matter of Carver v Nassau County Interim Fin. Auth., 2016 NY Slip Op 05995, 2nd Dept 9-14-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (MUNICIPAL LAW, COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS)/WAGE FREEZE (COUNTY HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A WAGE FREEZE TO ADDRESS A FINANCIAL CRISIS)

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