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Court of Claims Must Determine the Interests of All Parties Named by the Attorney General as Potentially Entitled to Payment for a Taking by the State—Therefore a Claimant Must Join all the Parties Named by the Attorney General

The Second Department explained the procedure under the Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL) for determining how to apportion payment for a taking when there is a dispute about which parties are entitled to payment. Under the EDPL and the Court of Claims Act, the Court of Claims must determine the interests of all parties named by the Attorney General as having a possible claim. Therefore a claimant must join all the named parties in any action seeking payment:

EDPL 304(E)(1) … provides that when the Attorney General determines that there is a conflict with regard to the person or persons legally entitled to receive payment for the value of property acquired by the State through the power of eminent domain, he or she shall request the Comptroller to deposit the funds in an interest-bearing account “to be distributed as ordered by the Court of Claims on application of any person claiming an interest in the amount” (EDPL 304[E][1]). The statute further provides that the procedure to be employed in connection with such an application “shall be the same as provided in [Court of Claims Act § 23],” and that “[n]o judgment of distribution shall be made unless the court shall first obtain personal jurisdiction over all persons certified by the Attorney General as having or claiming to have an interest in the fund” (EDPL 304[E][1]).

The claimant argues, in effect, that Mazur Brothers, Inc. (hereinafter MBI), an entity that the Attorney General has determined has a possible interest in the subject proceeds, does not in fact have any such interest and that, therefore, the claimant was under no obligation to join MBI as a party to this claim. In advancing this argument, however, the claimant essentially asked the Court of Claims to assume the very fact that is the ultimate fact that must be proven, namely, that MBI has no interest in the money deposited by the Comptroller. Without jurisdiction over MBI, it would have been improper for the Court of Claims to grant the relief requested by the claimant in connection with this claim. Indeed, as the claimant appears to have recognized, its remedy, under these circumstances, lies in a special distribution proceeding pursuant to EDPL 304 … . Mazur Bros. Realty, LLC v State of New York, 2015 NY Slip Op 06119, 2nd Dept 7-15-15

 

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