You are here: / / IN THIS FIRE-DAMAGE CASE, THE INSURANCE POLICY IMPOSED A TWO-YEAR LIMITATION...
, ,

IN THIS FIRE-DAMAGE CASE, THE INSURANCE POLICY IMPOSED A TWO-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD; THE ACTION WAS NOT BROUGHT UNTIL SIX YEARS AFTER THE FIRE; PLAINTIFF’S FAILURE TO PROVIDE ANY DETAILS DEMONSTRATING WHY THE RESTORATION COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE TWO-YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT; THREE-JUDGE DISSENT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Singas, over an extensive three-judge dissent, determined plaintiff’s complaint in this fire-damage case was properly dismissed because the contractual two-year limitation period was exceeded and plaintiff made only conclusory allegations that the repairs could not be made within that two-year period:

On this motion to dismiss, the Tower/AmTrust defendants met their burden of establishing, by reference to the contract’s two-year suit limitation provision, that the action was time-barred because plaintiff did not commence it within two years of the fire, utterly refuting plaintiff’s factual allegations … . Nothing in plaintiff’s response raised any issue as to whether the provision should bar her claims. Plaintiff’s allegation that “[g]iven the massive structural damage wrought by the fire, the restoration of [plaintiff’s] property would have been [a] multi-year process under even the best of circumstances” is a conclusory statement that the suit limitation provision was unreasonable and is not logically inconsistent with the replacement of the property within the two-year limitation period. Here, plaintiff failed to allege actions that she took to complete the repairs within two years; she did not provide any details regarding the extent of the damage, other than that the damage was “massive” and the fire set off four alarms, or why complete restoration within two years was an impossibility. This bare-bones allegation stands in stark contrast to the plaintiff’s factual assertions in [Executive Plaza, LLC v Peerless Ins. Co. (22 NY3d 511)]. There, the plaintiff pleaded the specific remedial actions taken to restore the property, including retaining an architect and construction company, submitting a variance application, and seeking and obtaining building permits, which were not issued until 20 months after the property damage … . Most importantly, that plaintiff provided that these remedial actions were taken within the limitation period. All of this information is notably absent from plaintiff’s pleadings and motion response here. Farage v Associated Ins. Mgt. Corp., 2024 NY Slip Op 05875, CtApp 11-26-24

Practice Point: Here the insurance contract imposed a two-year limitation on claims for the cost of fire-damage repair. Plaintiff did not bring the action until six years after the fire. The complaint was properly dismissed because it did not provide any details explaining why the repairs could not have been made during the two-year limitation period.

 

You might also like
​ ALTHOUGH THE STATUTORY SPEEDY TRIAL RULES DO NOT APPLY TO STAND-ALONE TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS, THE PEOPLE AGREED TO DISMISS THE TRAFFIC INFRACTION ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS; THE PEOPLE THEN APPEALED; THE COURT OF APPEALS, OVER A DISSENT, HELD THE MATTER WAS NOT REVIEWABLE (CT APP). ​
Defendant Entitled to a Hearing on His Motion to Vacate His Conviction/Defense Counsel’s Failure to Move to Suppress Statements, to Challenge Search Warrants, to Request Discovery and to Object to the Conduct of the Prosecutor Raised Questions of Effective Assistance
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN A DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ACTION PURSUANT TO GENERAL BUSINESS LAW 349 (H) ARE LIMITED TO THREE TIMES ACTUAL DAMAGES (CT APP).
REINSURANCE POLICIES TO BE INTERPRETED USING STANDARD CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION OR RULE OF CONSTRUCTION CONCERNING WHETHER A COVERAGE CAP INCLUDES ONLY LOSS, OR INCLUDES BOTH LOSS AND LITIGATION COSTS (CT APP).
MONITORING AND RECORDING PHONE CALLS MADE BY PRETRIAL DETAINEES WHO ARE NOTIFIED THE CALLS ARE MONITORED AND RECORDED DOES NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE RECORDINGS MAY BE SHARED WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORS WITHOUT A WARRANT (CT APP).
No Prejudice from Loss of Hand-Written Police Report (Rosario Material)/Trial Judge Did Not Abuse Discretion In Denying Request for Adverse Inference Jury Charge
THE INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN THE ENVELOPE CONTAINING THE RPAPL 1304 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE DOES NOT VIOLATE RPAPL 1304 AND IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR AWARDING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION (CT APP) ​
Civil Commitment of Two Sex Offenders Reversed—In One Case the Proof the Offender Had “Serious Difficulty In Controlling” His Sexual Conduct Within the Meaning of Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law Was Legally Insufficient—In the Other Case, Proof the Offender Suffered from Anti-Social Personality Disorder (ASPC) Alone Did Not Meet the Definition of “Mental Abnormality” in Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE CRITERIA FOR ALLOWING EXPERT TESTIMONY ON WITNESS-IDENTIFICATION OF A DEFENDANT... A LIENHOLDER NONPARTY TO AN ACTION THAT RESULTED IN A FEE AWARD TO A DEBTOR...