POLICY LANGUAGE MUST BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT COVERAGE OF ADDITIONAL INSUREDS IS TRIGGERED ONLY WHEN THE INSURED IS NEGLIGENT, NOT MERELY WHEN THE ACTIONS OF THE INSURED HAVE A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INJURY.
The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a two-judge dissenting opinion authored by Judge Fahey, reversing the appellate division, determined the language of the personal injury insurance policy did not support coverage of the additional insureds. The New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) had contracted with BSI for construction work on a subway tunnel. BSI took out an insurance policy from Burlington. NYCTA, the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and New York City were named as additional insureds. An NYCTA employee was injured when a machine operated by BSI struck a live electric cable buried in concrete. The NYCTA had neglected to mark the location of the cable and turn off the power. The question before the court was whether, pursuant to the policy language, the additional insureds were covered when the insured, BSI, was not negligent, or whether the causal relationship between BSI and the accident triggered coverage of the additional insureds:
It is well established in our law that “but for” causation, or causation in fact, is “[t]he cause without which the event could not have occurred” … . The term refers to a link in the chain leading to an outcome, and in the abstract does no more than state the obvious, that “any given event, including an injury, is always the result of many causes” … . However, not all “but for” causes result in liability and “[m]ost causes can be ignored in tort litigation” … . In contrast, “proximate cause” refers to a “legal cause” to which the Court has assigned liability … . The dissent suggests that “proximate cause” and “but-for cause” may be equivalent concepts (dissenting op at 14), but the law is clear that the two are not synonymous … . As the Court has explained, “‘because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point'”… .
Here, the Burlington policy endorsement states that the injury must be “caused, in whole or in part” by BSI. These words require proximate causation since “but for” causation cannot be partial. An event may not be wholly or partially connected to a result, it either is or it is not connected. Stated differently, although there may be more than one proximate cause, all “but for” causes bear some connection to the outcome even if all do not lead to legal liability. Thus, these words — “in whole or in part” — can only modify “proximate cause” … . Burlington Ins. Co. v NYC Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 04384, CtApp 6-6-17
INSURANCE LAW (POLICY LANGUAGE MUST BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT COVERAGE OF ADDITIONAL INSUREDS IS TRIGGERED ONLY WHEN THE INSURED IS NEGLIGENT, NOT MERELY WHEN THE ACTIONS OF THE INSURED HAVE A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INJURY)/NEGLIGENCE (INSURANCE LAW, POLICY LANGUAGE MUST BE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT COVERAGE OF ADDITIONAL INSUREDS IS TRIGGERED ONLY WHEN THE INSURED IS NEGLIGENT, NOT MERELY WHEN THE ACTIONS OF THE INSURED HAVE A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INJURY)