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​ THE TARGETS OF A NO-KNOCK WARRANT ARE OWED A “SPECIAL DUTY” SUCH THAT A MUNICIPALITY MAY BE LIABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE POLICE OFFICERS EXECUTING THE WARRANT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a comprehensive opinion by Judge Singas, over a two-judge dissent, determined the police owe a “special duty” to those targeted by a no-knock warrant such that liability may be imposed on a municipality for the negligence of the police during execution of the warrant.. Here plaintiff alleged he was shot by a police officer who entered the apartment where he was sleeping.. The certified question from the Second Circuit asked if the “special duty” requirement applies in this situation, or whether it is triggered only when the municipality fails to protect the plaintiff from injury by a third party who is not a municipal employee. The opinion lays out the confusing interplay between the “special duty” requirement and the “governmental-function immunity” affirmative defense, which can defeat a plaintiff’s action even if a “special duty” is deemed to exist. The dissent argued the “special duty” requirement itself is invalid and the “ordinary negligence” standard should apply to governmental actors:

Our precedent dictates that a plaintiff must establish a special duty when suing a municipality in negligence. However, because the underlying premise of the certified question appears to be that a special duty could not be established in a scenario like the one presented, we take this opportunity to clarify that this is not the case: a special duty may be established where the police plan and execute a no-knock search warrant on a targeted residence. Although we have not yet had an occasion to address application of the special duty rule to the execution of no-knock search warrants, that situation fits within the existing parameters of our special duty precedent.

From the dissent:

The majority’s principal error, which infects its entire analysis, is embodied in the following statement: “Consistent with our precedent and the purpose of the special duty rule, we reiterate that plaintiffs must establish that a municipality owed them a special duty when they assert a negligence claim based on actions taken by a municipality acting in a governmental capacity” … . That statement: (1) is not consistent with our precedent, in which we have repeatedly evaluated negligence claims against governmental actors by asking whether an ordinary duty exists; and (2) improperly incorporates the governmental/proprietary distinction from immunity law into negligence law … . Ferreira v City of Binghamton, 2022 NY Slip Op 01953, CtApp 3-22-22

Practice Point: This opinion lays out in detail the confusing interplay between the “special duty” requirement for a negligence suit against a municipality and the “governmental-function immunity” affirmative defense which can defeat a negligence suit even where a special duty is deemed to exist. Here the Court of Appeals determined those targeted by a no-knock warrant are owed a special duty such that a party injured in the warrant-execution may sue the municipality for the negligence of a police officer. The dissent argued the “special duty” requirement is itself invalid and an ordinary negligence standard should apply.

 

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