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COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM.

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant transit authority’s motion for summary judgment should have been granted. Plaintiff slipped on snow on a step as she got off a bus:

Plaintiff testified that she slipped and fell as she was exiting a bus owned and operated by defendants because the step was covered with a slushy condition. She and the bus driver both stated that there was snow all over the ground from a storm that had ended earlier that day, and certified meteorological records submitted by defendants demonstrated that a snow storm that started the previous night and ended earlier in the day of the accident had left about six inches of snow on the ground. The bus driver also testified that passengers tracked snow onto the bus on their shoes and boots as they boarded.

Common carriers are not obligated to provide a “constant remedy” for the tracking of water onto a bus during an ongoing storm or for a reasonable time thereafter … . Similarly, when the ground is covered with snow left by a recent storm, “it would be unreasonable to expect the [defendants] to constantly clean the front steps of the subject bus” … . Plaintiff’s argument that defendants failed to show lack of notice of the slushy condition is irrelevant, since they did not breach any duty of care under the existing weather conditions. Harbison v New York City Tr. Auth., 2017 NY Slip Op 01503, 1st Dept 2-28-17

 

NEGLIGENCE (COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/BUSES (SLIP AND FALL, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)/SLIP AND FALL (BUSES, COMMON CARRIERS DO NOT HAVE A DUTY TO KEEP BUS STEPS FREE OF SNOW TRACKED IN DUE TO A RECENT STORM)

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