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QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER THE BUILDING MANAGEMENT COMPANY WAS LIABLE, PURSUANT TO ESPINAL FACTORS, FOR INFANT PLAINTIFF’S FALL INTO THE ELEVATOR SHAFT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined there were questions of fact whether the building manager, Synoptic, was liable in this elevator accident case. The elevator was subject to a code violation because a “drop key” was available to tenants which allowed the elevator door to be opened when the elevator cab was not at that floor. Infant plaintiff fell into the open shaft after her nanny opened the door. The contract between Synoptic and the building owner raised questions of fact whether Espinal factors imposed liability on Synoptic:

A contracting party may not be liable in tort to a noncontracting third-party for its negligent performance unless it launches a force or instrument of harm by creating or exacerbating an unreasonable risk of harm, the noncontracting third party detrimentally relies on its performances, or it completely displaces the other party’s duty to maintain premises safely … . …

Whether Synoptic made the repairs itself or was qualified to do so is irrelevant as to whether it owed plaintiff a duty. Rather its duty arises from its contractual obligation under the comprehensive management agreement obligating it to, inter alia, maintain the property and cause needed repairs to the elevator … .

Here, issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiffs detrimentally relied on Synoptic to perform its contractual duties to maintain, cause repairs to be made to, and correct violations regarding the elevator … , and whether Synoptic launched a force of harm by providing residents access to the drop key to use the freight elevator … . According to … deposition, [testimony]  Synoptic had notice that residents were using the drop key to access the freight elevator. Further, at the very least, issues of fact exist as to whether it had notice that the repairs to address the violation were never completed. XX v Dunwell El. Elec. Indus., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 06376, First Dept 11-5-20

 

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