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SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF PREMISES ASSAULT.

The Second Department determined the school’s motion for summary judgment was properly granted. Plaintiff and her father were allegedly assaulted 30 to 100 feet beyond the entrance to the infant plaintiff’s school by students from the school:

With respect to the contention that the defendants may be liable for the infant plaintiff’s injuries, a school’s duty is coextensive with, and concomitant with, its physical custody and control over a child …. “When that custody ceases because the child has passed out of the orbit of its authority in such a way that the parent is perfectly  free to reassume control over the child’s protection, the school’s custodial duty also ceases” … . “As a result, where a student is injured off school premises, there can generally be no actionable breach of a duty that extends only to the boundaries of school property” … . Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that they may not be held liable for the infant plaintiff’s injuries since, at the time of the subject incident, the infant plaintiff was no longer in their custody or under their control and was, thus, outside the orbit of their authority … .

Nor is there a basis to impose liability upon the defendants for the injuries sustained by the infant plaintiff or her father for failure to provide adequate security, since the defendants demonstrated that they did not affirmatively assume a duty to protect either plaintiff from criminal activity which occurred off the school premises … . Hernandez v City of New York, 2017 NY Slip Op 00962, 2nd Dept 2-8-17

 

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF PREMISES ASSAULT)/NEGLIGENCE (SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF PREMISES ASSAULT)/ASSAULT (NEGLIGENCE, SCHOOL NOT LIABLE FOR OFF PREMISES ASSAULT)

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