You are here: / / FAMILY COURT DID NOT ARTICULATE ITS REASONS FOR DETERMINING CHILD SUPPORT...
,

FAMILY COURT DID NOT ARTICULATE ITS REASONS FOR DETERMINING CHILD SUPPORT BASED ON PARENTAL INCOME IN EXCESS OF THE STATUTORY CAP; THE ORIGINAL SUPPORT LEVEL BASED ON THE STATUTORY CAP REINSTATED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined father’s objections to the level of mother’s child support obligation should not have been granted. Family Court had more than doubled the support obligations based on the couple’s income level, which was above the statutory cap. But Family Court did not sufficiently articulate the reasoning underlying the discretionary increase:

The Child Support Standards Act “‘sets forth a formula for calculating child support by applying a designated statutory percentage, based upon the number of children to be supported, to combined parental income up to a particular ceiling'” … . “Where . . . the combined parental income exceeds the statutory cap, in fixing the basic child support obligation on income over the cap, the court has the discretion to apply the factors set forth in Family Court Act § 413(1)(f), or to apply the statutory percentages, or to apply both” … . “However, the Family Court must articulate an explanation of the basis for its calculation of child support based on parental income in excess of the statutory cap” … . “This articulation should reflect ‘a careful consideration of the stated basis for its exercise of discretion, the parties’ circumstances, and its reasoning why there [should or] should not be a departure from the prescribed percentage'” … .

Here, the Family Court did not set forth a sufficient basis for its determination to calculate child support based on combined parental income exceeding the statutory cap. Further, the record shows that based on certain factors, including the parties’ disparity in income and the child’s standard of living, the child support obligation should be calculated based only on combined parental income up to the statutory cap … . Matter of Butta v Realbuto, 2023 NY Slip Op 01671, Second Dept 3-29-23

Practice Point: The court must articulate its reasons for determining child support based upon parental income exceeding the statutory cap. Here the court’s failure to do so resulted in reinstating the child support level which was based on the statutory cap.

 

You might also like
IN THIS STATUTORY RAPE CASE WHERE THE VICTIM WAS FIVE YEARS YOUNGER THAN DEFENDANT, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FROM LEVEL TWO TO LEVEL ONE (SECOND DEPT).
HERE THE ADMINISTRATOR OF PLAINTIFF’S DECEDENT’S ESTATE BROUGHT A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION IN SUPREME COURT AND DEFENDANTS MOVED FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARGUING PLANTIFF’S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY WAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION; RATHER THAN DECIDE THE MOTION, SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE REFERRED THE MATTER TO THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD WHICH HAS PRIMARY JURISDICTION RE: THE APPLICABILITY OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (SECOND DEPT).
THE ALLEGATION THE CAR IN FRONT MADE A SUDDEN STOP DOES NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT IN A REAR-END COLLISION (SECOND DEPT).
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SMALL TABLE OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED AND FELL WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT). ​
A “HIGH COST LOAN” AS DEFINED BY THE BANKING LAW IS A DEFENSE TO A FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
Insurance Law 5214 Does Not Apply Where Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) Is Sued Directly Because the Identity of the Driver Who Caused Plaintiff’s Injury Is Unknown/Default Judgment Against MVAIC Properly Entered
THE PEOPLE DID NOT MEET THEIR BURDEN TO SHOW THE LEGALITY OF THE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT’S CLOTHES BY A DETECTIVE AT THE HOSPITAL WHERE DEFENDANT WAS BEING TREATED FOR A GUNSHOT WOUND; THE CLOTHES AND THE DNA EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM THE CLOTHES SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS HOWEVER (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DRIVER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS PEDESTRIAN-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; PLAINTIFF’S EIGHT-YEAR-OLD SON WAS MORE THAN HALFWAY ACROSS THE STREET WHEN STRUCK (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DECIDED MOTHER’S CUSTODY PETITION WITHOUT A... THE ARTICLE 78 PETITION SOUGHT RELIEF NOT AVAILABLE IN SUCH A PROCEEDING (REMOVAL...