You are here: / / PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE...

PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff (Heidi) had recorded her deed and mortgage before defendant bank (M & T) recorded its mortgage (to secure a loan to a co-tenant). Therefore defendant bank had notice of plaintiff’s prior interests:

“The New York Recording Act … , inter alia, protects a good faith purchaser for value from an unrecorded interest in a property, provided such a purchaser’s interest is first to be duly recorded … . The status of good faith purchaser for value cannot be maintained by a purchaser with either notice or knowledge of a prior interest or equity in the property, or one with knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonably prudent purchaser to make inquiries concerning such”… . “The recording of a transaction involving real property provides potential subsequent purchasers [and encumbrancers] with notice of previous conveyances and encumbrances that might affect their interests. If the [encumbrancer] fails to use due diligence in examining the title, he or she is chargeable, as a matter of law, with notice of the facts which a proper inquiry would have disclosed” … . The encumbrancer “must be presumed to have investigated the title, and to have examined every deed or instrument properly recorded, and to have known every fact disclosed or to which an inquiry suggested by the record would have led” … .

Here, the Supreme Court erred in failing to award Heidi … proceeds from the sale of the property, the entire principal of her mortgage, plus interest, and reasonable collection costs, including an attorney’s fee and disbursements incurred in collecting the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. Heidi demonstrated that her mortgage and the … deed were duly recorded prior to M & T’s mortgage. Therefore, Heidi established that M & T is chargeable with notice of these prior interests. Gregg v M&T Bank Corp., 2018 NY Slip Op 02774, Second Dept 4-25-18

​REAL PROPERTY LAW (GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/MORTGAGES (REAL PROPERTY LAW, GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/DEEDS  (REAL PROPERTY LAW, GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/GOOD FAITH PURCHASER  (REAL PROPERTY LAW, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))/RECORDING (DEEDS AND MORTGAGES, GOOD FAITH PURCHASER, REAL PROPERTY LAW, PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE BY DEFENDANT BANK, DEFENDANT BANK WAS NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER IN THAT IT IS DEEMED TO HAVE PRIOR NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S INTERESTS, SUPREME COURT REVERSED (SECOND DEPT))

You might also like
THE GOVERNOR’S COVID-19-RELATED REDUCTION IN THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF DESIGNATING-PETITION SIGNATURES UNDER THE ELECTION LAW DOES NOT APPLY TO THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF DESIGNATING-PETITION SIGNATURES UNDER THE NEW YORK CITY CHARTER (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANT DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL WHEN DEFENSE ATTORNEY INDICATED THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE SAW WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE SEEN BEFORE THE EMPLOYEE’S GARBAGE CART COLLIDED WITH PLAINTIFF’S SCOOTER AS PLAINTIFF BACKED OUT OF AN ELEVATOR (SECOND DEPT).
THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISION WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF THE LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION DID NOT APPLY TO PLAINTIFF’S DEMOLITION-WORK-INJURY; THE DEFENDANT GENERAL CONTRACTOR DID NOT EXERCISE SUPERVISORY CONTROL OVER PLAINTIFF’S WORK AND WAS NOT, THEREFORE, LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200 (SECOND DEPT).
Out of State Visitation for All School Breaks and Three-Day Weekends (In Addition To Summers) Should Not Have Been Granted
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER SCHOOL BUS DRIVER AND MONITOR TOOK APPROPRIATE STEPS AFTER THE FIGHT IN WHICH PLAINTIFF STUDENT WAS INJURED BROKE OUT ON THE BUS (SECOND DEPT).
AFTER MAKING A FINAL AWARD, THE RABBINICAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY BY MAKING A SECOND AWARD BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT TO THE PROCEDURE RE AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PROBATION AND DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A HEARING, APPELLATE REVIEW APPROPRIATE IN THE ABSENCE OF PRESERVATION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2024 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE SELLERS OF A CONDOMINIUM FOR... DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEREFORE WORKERS’...