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STATUTE ALLOWING PROPERTY OWNERS TO CHOOSE SCHOOL DISTRICTS DOES NOT APPLY TO CONDOMINIUMS WHICH LIE ON THE BORDER BETWEEN TWO DISTRICTS.

The Second Department, affirming Supreme Court’s grant of a motion to set aside plaintiffs’ verdict, determined the statute which allows a property owner to select a school district when the boundary between school districts passes through the owner’s property does not apply to condominiums. The case turned on the interpretation of the statute, which referred only to boundaries passing through single family residences:

… [T]he plain language of Education Law § 3203(1)(b) and its legislative history demonstrate that the statute is applicable only where property is improved by one single family dwelling unit, and not multiple single family dwelling units, and where the school district boundary line intersects property that the dwelling unit is located on. The Supreme Court properly determined that the subject 28-unit condominium complex is not “an owner-occupied single family dwelling unit” located on property intersected by a boundary line within the meaning of Education Law § 3203(1)(b). Therefore, the court properly granted those branches of the school defendants’ motion which were to set aside the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs … . Palm v Tuckahoe Union Free School Dist., 2016 NY Slip Op 05558. 2nd Dept 7-20-16

EDUCATION-SCHOOL LAW (STATUTE ALLOWING PROPERTY OWNERS TO CHOOSE SCHOOL DISTRICTS DOES NOT APPLY TO CONDOMINIUMS WHICH LIE ON THE BORDER BETWEEN TWO DISTRICTS)/SCHOOL DISTRICTS (STATUTE ALLOWING PROPERTY OWNERS TO CHOOSE SCHOOL DISTRICTS DOES NOT APPLY TO CONDOMINIUMS WHICH LIE ON THE BORDER BETWEEN TWO DISTRICTS)

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