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JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH BOTH QUALIFYING OFFENSES AND OFFENSES WHICH ARE NEITHER QUALIFYING NOR DISQUALIFYING.

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Sweeny, determined the defendant was eligible for judicial diversion where defendant was charged with both statutorily qualifying offenses and other offenses which were nowhere defined as qualifying or disqualifying offenses:

The Legislature amended the DLRA [Drug Law Reform Act] in 2009, enacting CPL 216.00 and 216.05 to create a mechanism for judicial diversion. Under this program, eligible felony offenders whose drug or alcohol abuse contributed to their criminal conduct, may, at the discretion of the court, be afforded the opportunity to avoid a felony conviction and a prison sentence by successfully participating in a judicially supervised substance abuse program. Unlike prior drug offense programs, judicial diversion does not require the prosecutor’s consent … . * * *

… [The statute] sets forth a list of disqualifying offenses/conditions that prevent a defendant from qualifying for judicial diversion, although as noted, even some of those offenses may not prevent disqualification with the People’s consent. In applying the principle “espressio unius est exclusio alterius,” “an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded” … . The inescapable conclusion is that the Legislature’s decision not to list certain offenses as disqualifying means their mere inclusion in an indictment will not prevent an otherwise eligible defendant from making an application for judicial diversion. People v Smith, 2016 NY Slip Op 02596, 1st Dept 4-5-16

CRIMINAL LAW (JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH BOTH QUALIFYING OFFENSES AND OFFENSES WHICH ARE NEITHER QUALIFYING NOR DISQUALIFYING)/JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM (JUDICIAL DIVERSION PROGRAM AVAILABLE TO DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH BOTH QUALIFYING OFFENSES AND OFFENSES WHICH ARE NEITHER QUALIFYING NOR DISQUALIFYING)

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LANDLORD OWED NO STATUTORY DUTY TO ABATE LEAD IN AN APARTMENT WHERE THE CHILD... DEFENDANTS WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY BY PARTICIPATING...